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Abstract 
 
This research studies the impact of positive emotions on altruism in different social 
contexts (or degrees of familiarity). In other words, it investigates to what extent emotional 
inducement techniques are able to stimulate pro-social behavior among perfect strangers and 
among real-life friends. 
A growing body of literature has studied the complex nature of emotions and their role in 
the decision making process. Other scholars have investigated how social networks influence 
people’s behavior. Yet most of the laboratory experiments in the field have focused 
predominantly on negative emotions, while keeping the subjects anonymous to each other 
without account for familiarity. To address this research gaps, I designed an experiment that 
compares four different treatments - a control group, a positive emotions group with strangers, 
an emotionally neutral group with friends, and a positive emotions group with friends. The 
participants in all groups were matched in pairs and played the “dictator game”. 
The results from the statistical analysis show that friendship is a highly significant 
predictor of altruistic behavior – the dictators in these treatments redistributed more money on 
average. On the other hand, positive emotions are not statistically significant, thus, failing to 
reject the null hypothesis. I look at three social theories that provide explanations for the strong 
connection between social relationships and altruism. Furthermore, I discuss why the emotional 
framing was not successful and stress on the role of negative emotions to provoke empathy and 
desire to help others. Additionally, I analyze the self-reported justifications of the subjects who 
pointed to sense of fairness and equality as their main motives to redistribute more. All of the 
presented arguments reveal the ambiguous nature of pro-social behavior - pure versus impure 
altruism. 
Despite some limitations, my experiment produced valid and interesting findings that 
raised some questions for future research. 
 
Keywords: Experimental economics, laboratory experiment, altruism, familiarity, positive 
emotions, dictator game. 
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“The emotional tail wags the rational dog.”- Jonathan Haidt 
 
“Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them.” – David Hume 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I find this quote by the American social psychologist J. Haidt remarkably apt if we want 
to explain human behavior using metaphors. We are used to think of ourselves as fully rational 
individuals that follow logical conclusions and rely on authentic evidence. The entire focus falls 
upon the “rational dog” – our reasoning – while neglecting the “emotional tail”.  We are 
“rational” - we keep saying that to ourselves. This is indeed right, but just partially, since we 
cannot get rid of our “emotional tail” – it will chase us, no matter where we want to go to. Thus, 
in order to understand the nature of human thinking, or decision making, we need to take the 
“dog” and the “tail” as a unity. Unity, defined by our own genetic evolution as a social species. 
The latter states something very important – it is not just the “dog and its tail”, but also the other 
“dogs and tails”, and the communication with them that matters. In fact, our societies are based 
on constant connection, interaction, and cooperation. In this process, though, one thing is clear 
– others trigger emotions within us. 
Looking at our “social” genes, modern genetics and evolutionary biology has found that 
certain genetic factors can explain prosocial behavior (Sturgis at al., 2010; Rubenstein and 
Kealey 2010). But why did we evolve this way? To answer this question, we need to refer to 
the multilevel selection theory. Wilson and Cox (2012) explain that each population is divided 
into subgroups between which social interaction occurs. Natural selection first maximizes the 
fitness of each member compared to its peers. If the provision of the public goods requires some 
costs, then this implies disadvantage to the individual. Hence, it seems that altruistic behavior 
has no chance to be successful and to be adopted by the entire population. However, this 
assumption may not hold true if we add another level of selection, that is, between-group 
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selection. This means that cooperators will survive and reproduce better than the free-riders, 
even though the former would be less fit than the latter. Which level of selection will prevail 
depends on their relative strength. Some factors are important here: the frequency of genetic 
variation of altruistic and selfish genes within and among groups; the amount of the individual 
cost for providing the public good; genotype- phenotype relationship; the evolution of a 
rewarding and punishing system. This may serve as a logical explanation how our species 
evolved by suppressing non-cooperative behavior (within-group selection) and promoting 
altruism and collaboration (in favor of between-group selection). Moreover, a theory suggested 
by William Hamilton (1963) also shows that altruistic behavior may emerge without 
reciprocity. An individual will help his relatives without any direct benefit because the 
evolutionary fitness of shared genes can be increased in this manner.  
Even though altruism has been a part of our social evolution and of our inner emotional 
world for so long, the term was coined only just in the 19th century by the great French 
philosopher Auguste Comte1. Some modern definitions of that term try to capture its essence. 
For example, Hoffman (1982) defines it as a behavior that benefits the other without any 
particular self-interest. Krebs (1970) claims that a person is an altruist if he or she is willing to 
sacrifice rewards for the sake of the others. Staub’s (1979) definition proposes a broader 
understanding of altruism. It states that this is a behavior in favor of the others regardless of its 
motivation.  
All this being said, we can conclude that altruism is an expression of concern about the 
well-being of the others. One could argue that such concern is capable of provoking certain 
personal feelings and desire to help. Then, if scientists agree that emotions play significant role 
in the way people make decisions2, and that we are “programmed” to connect and cooperate, 
our own emotional responses to the behavior of others can probably predict how successful a 
particular cooperative mechanism would be, simply because pro-social3 behavior depends on 
the individual’s decision to contribute, and the individual’s decision is dependent upon 
emotional reactions. Surely, one cannot explain collective action problem, or why cooperators 
and free-riders coexist, entirely by referring to emotional bias.  The “me versus us” dilemma is 
much more complex than that. Many scholars from different scientific areas have contributed 
to solve this enigma. Economists are no exception. 
                                                          
1 https://www.britannica.com/topic/altruism-ethics  
2 An overview of this claim is presented in the Literature Review 
3 I use the terms “cooperative” and “prosocial” interchangeably.  
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Classic economic models have tried to provide arguments about individual and collective 
behavior. Most of the predictions in economics are based on rational choice theory: it assumes 
fully rational and selfish individuals who make logical decisions to maximize their utility when 
faced with a certain constraint.  However, the way agents make decisions in reality often 
contradicts what theoretic models predict. Therefore, the need to find a more comprehensive 
explanation has inspired economists to take a broader look at this issue. During the last three 
decades some scholars have adopted a multidisciplinary approach to understanding human 
behavior. It involves cognitive psychology, neuroscience and game theory in order to explain 
why agents tend to deviate from entirely rational behavior as assumed. The outcome is that 
behavioral economics has emerged to answer the question why people often act in a way that 
does not maximize their expected utility. For instance, if a fully rational individual would 
always prefer something to nothing, why, in many experiments, do participants choose different 
options that are inferior to the best solution? These types of studies, comprising game theoretic 
experiments, framing, heuristics, market inefficiencies and even MRI, try to catch and present 
factors that have been dismissed so far. Yet further investigation in the field is needed to build 
up a better understanding of economic behavior and public choice. First, most of the academic 
work has been focused on emotional responses and cooperation predominantly regards negative 
emotions such as shame, guilt, remorse (Barr, 2001; Bowles and Gintis, 2003), while neglecting 
the positive ones, such as joy, pleasure, and sense of belonging to a group. Second, how the 
type of connection between the subjects in the experiment alters their contributions needs to be 
explored further. 
Inspired by this fascinating scientific area, and trying to address the research gaps 
mentioned above, I dedicate my efforts to study the complex nature of human cooperative and 
altruistic behavior, even though my own research is just a small drop in the stormy sea called 
experimental or behavioral economics. However, with my current work, presented as a Master’s 
thesis, I intend to address three major issues. 
First, the purpose of this research is to study the complex connection between emotions 
and decision-making process, and particularly, their role when it comes to altruism. By creating 
framing effects, my study aims to explore the impact of emotions on the decision each member 
of a pair would make in the case of redistribution of goods.  
Second, I seek to investigate if the presence of familiarity provides a stronger emotional 
inducement for people to increase their willingness to contribute. I compare treatments that 
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reflect the impact of emotions and familiarity, and how they influence our decisions 
subconsciously.  
Third, with my current work, I would like to share some thoughts about rational choice 
theory and other theories that explain social behavior. Human beings believe they act rationally 
without perceiving they are biased by their own feeling or moods. Therefore, this study intends 
to be just one of many steps that intend to shed more light on the limitations of rational choice 
theory and classical economic models, and to suggest ways in which theory and models could 
be expanded to take into account the role of emotions.  
For this reason, I aim to answer these three research questions in the working process:  
1. What can these findings tell us about rationality, emotions and decision making? 
2. To what extend can human rational behavior be influenced by creating a frame and 
provoking emotions in order to stimulate cooperation? 
3. Can this effect be enhanced in the presence of an “object”, towards which the emotional 
response is directed, i.e. when playing with/against a member of the subjects’ social 
network (e.g. a friend)? 
My research is part of the fast-growing and rapidly developing scientific field of 
behavioral economics. I argue that the chosen direction is vital for the better understanding of 
decision making in economic games and human nature in general. Moreover, if social sciences 
concentrate on developing models that predict and explain why agents act in a certain way, a 
systematical knowledge about human behavior that takes the human being as a unity of 
rationality and emotionality is demanded. It is in this theoretical background that I place my 
research, which could be a foundation for a future work.  
This thesis is structured as follows. First, I present the knowledge in this field brought to 
us by previous research and academic work. I divide the body of my literature review in three 
major parts: psychological and neuroscientific framework; previous lab experiments in the 
field; the power of social networks and some real-life cases of successful long-term cooperation 
in small communities that show how familiarity and interpersonal relations work in practice. 
Then I elaborate my methodology and my laboratory experiment’s design, and mention some 
ethical considerations. In the third chapter, I show the results, analyze them, and provide 
possible explanations of the outcomes derived from my study. Additionally, I comment on the 
drawbacks and problems of my research, and provide some suggestions about future work. The 
last section concludes. 
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Literature Review 
 
I divide the body of my literature review into three major parts. First, I present some 
evidence about how emotions influence rational decision-making suggested by cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience. Then I refer to various studies that include emotions and their 
impact on cooperation and altruism tested in laboratory settings. The third part gives insight 
into social networks and how they shape our willingness to collaborate with others. 
 
Psychological and neuroscientific evidence 
Explaining human behavior or how we think has never been an easy task. Probably one 
of the most famous names currently in cognitive psychology is Daniel Kahneman. In his book 
“Thinking fast and slow”, the author describes the mechanism of thinking as driven by two 
different systems. Кahneman defines them as: 
„System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control.” 
„System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including 
complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration.“ (Kahneman 2011, 18) 
Kahneman argues that our mind uses them both in performing daily tasks by switching 
between them. System 1 is said to run “automatically” and System 2 operates on full capacity 
only when a deeper processing of information is needed. “Impressions, intuitions, intentions, 
and feelings” (page 20) occur in System 1 that sends them as signals to System 2. If the latter 
adopts them, they turn into beliefs and voluntary actions. Although this process functions 
smoothly, there are still errors, because System 1 is biased (i.e. its focus is familiar situations, 
short-term predictions, and initial reactions to challenges) and therefore produces false beliefs 
and predictions in certain circumstances. This means that situations, in which System 2 and its 
problem-solving abilities are required, System 1 takes control and provides wrong answers.  
Kahneman claims that System 1 cannot be turned off. I argue that this statement actually 
lies at the core of a new understanding about rational behavior and how such behavior will be 
blurred by the activities of System 1. If strong emotions, for example, occur in one’s mind, in 
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short-term they might prevent the intervention of System 2 and thus result in different choices 
or decisions.  
In his work, Kahneman quotes Paul Slovic (Slovic et al., 2002, cited by Kahneman, 2011) 
and his research about formation of opinions based on feelings. Slovic coined the term “affect 
heuristics” to describe how “people make judgments and decisions by consulting their 
emotions: Do I like it? Do I hate it? How strongly do I feel about it?”(Kahneman 2011, 115). 
The question about the real characteristics of a certain object is substituted by the question how 
we feel about it. People tend to choose something simply because they like it, not because there 
is a considerable and objective evidence to act so. Slovic et al., followed in the steps of the 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994,1996, cited by Kahneman 2011), who claimed that 
“emotional evaluations of outcomes, and the bodily states and the approach and avoidance 
tendencies associated with them, all play a central role in guiding decision making” (Kahneman 
2011, 115). In other words, emotional states play a considerable role in the process of making 
a decision when choosing between different options or building preferences. 
The discussion on emotions and how they affect us is the focus of the book “Explaining 
Social Behavior” (2007) by Jon Elster. According to Elster, emotions are accountable for “the 
most important sources of happiness and misery”, “action tendencies that are associated with 
the emotions” and “their impact on other mental states, notably on beliefs” (Elster 2007, 145). 
He also analyzes the decision-making process and shows how emotions influence rationality. 
In his model, Elster assumes three important requirements for “rational action” (Elster 2007,  
191):  
1. “The action must be optimal, given the beliefs.” 
2. “The beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the evidence.” 
3. “The evidence must result from an optimal investment in information gathering“ 
The model looks stable, but if emotions are introduced, the assumptions above about 
rational choice may not hold. For instance, if person X prefers A to B when under the influence 
of emotions or drugs, he or she may choose B to A in every other situation. The rational decision 
making process may be plotted schematically as follows:  
12 
 
  
We can follow Elster’s thoughts on how emotions influence each stage. First, feelings 
that provoke urgency and low future-discounting may lead to insufficient gathering of 
information and poor evidence. Second, an emotion-induced bias is formed in the belief system. 
Third, an action readiness occurs that becomes stronger with the intensity of the transient 
feelings. Thus, a desire to act immediately may be harmful or non-optimal.  
Moreover, we need to recall that none of us can isolate him/herself completely when 
making a decision. As Elster points out, some emotions are often transmuted into others because 
of social norms that judge the former as unacceptable. This testifies for the existence of hidden 
motivation justified by different reasons in order to be consistent with the moral imperative. An 
emotionally-charged situation can also twist the rational mechanism since nobody can fully 
disregard the emotions of other agents who face a similar decision. Lastly, the evidence each 
individual relies on could be based on the irrational actions of somebody else.  
The emotional impact on each stage of the decision-making process and the interaction 
with other people’s feelings lead us to the two limitations of rational choice theory stated by 
Jon Elster. Indeterminacy (Elster 2007, 207-208) exists when the person is indifferent between 
several options or his preference might be incomplete and when he or she finds it difficult to 
determine “optimal investment in information gathering”. The second one is irrationality (see 
Elster 2007, chapters 12 and 13).  
Jon Elster suggests a broader understanding of the phenomenon by introducing the term 
“non-irrationality”. To shed more light on “non-rational” mechanisms, a considerable body of 
literature deals with these issues. In her review, Virlics (2013) argues that emotions play an 
influential role in decision-making and stresses the importance of studying the interaction 
between their effects and the cognitive processes in our mind. She organizes the main 
psychological factors suggested by behavioral economics and neuroeconomics into two groups: 
biases and preferences in decision making. 
Information 
gathering
Evidence
Belief 
system
Decision
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Dr. Steven Stosny (2017) indicates that shared emotional response is the core of 
cooperation, therefore, emotions are highly contagious. Not only that, but also the way we feel 
from the inside is often projected onto others. Does the latter mean that people are also willing 
to share their victories, trophies or success with others when they feel happy? My experiment 
will put this hypothesis to the test, but what is also essential is that Dr. Stosny points out 
something very interesting: positive emotions are reciprocated by others 70% of the time, while 
negative emotions are returned back almost 100% of the time. Probably, this is one of the main 
reasons why experimenters prefer to provoke negative emotional responses in their subjects. 
Up to this point, this negative ratio can be a challenge in every experiment that deals with 
positive emotion induction. 
Fassler and Haley (2003) take an evolutionary biological stance. According to them, 
cooperation is shaped by and even impossible without emotions. They point out their role in 
natural selection and the social evolution of our species in order to enhance biological fitness 
under certain conditions. The authors divide emotions into two major groups: emotions in 
dyadic relationships and in collective contexts. They stress the influence of pride and shame in 
collective action and cooperation. Although cultural differences do exist, there are similar 
features in every community and therefore the researchers should further investigate the impact 
of emotional behavior in maximizing utility viewed as a unity of personal bias and awareness 
about others’ emotions. Fassler and Haley conclude that emotions have evolved as a completely 
“rational” phenomenon to ensure cooperation and the survival of our species.  
One is not able to fully discover the complex nature of human emotions and pro-social 
behavior without investigating the physiology of the brain. Several studies provide evidence in 
this regard. Loewenstein (2000) and Loewenstein et al. (2001) claim that in addition to expected 
emotions, such as disappointment and regret, researchers should consider immediate emotions 
that occur during the process of deciding as well. To do so, Sanfey et al. (2009) examined the 
brain while making a decision. They found that the emotional system located in limbic areas 
can guide our behavior automatically or produce outcomes that would require otherwise 
significant efforts if undertaken consciously. Loewenstein et al. (2001) also reveal the dual 
mechanism that operates in our brain. According to their study, emotions have a decisive impact 
on cognition, because the signaling in the brain from the emotional system to the cognitive 
system (located in the frontal areas) is stronger compared to the opposite direction from the 
cognitive system to the emotional system. Thus, the neuropsychological evidence fully supports 
Kahneman’s concept about the two systems. 
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De Martino et al. (2006) admit the influence of emotional, heuristic biases on decision-
making process, and intend to shed more light on the underlying neurobiological basis. In their 
experiment, they use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and find that decisions 
made in accordance with Prospect Theory coined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1986) are 
related to higher levels of activity in the amygdala, while these subjects who chose contrary to 
the behavioral tendency predetermined by the framing effect showed higher activation in the 
orbital and medial prefrontal cortex, and, thus, acted more “rationally”. The results suggest an 
opponency between these two systems (recall Kahneman (2011) and his concept of System 1 
and System 2), both contributing to distinct functional roles in decision-making.  
Adolphs (2006) investigates what makes social cognition “special” by studying the role 
of the amygdala in processing stimuli from the social environment. He argues that moral 
judgements about other people directs our desire to behave with respect to them, that is to say, 
our motivation to help them or punish them, which is the setting in many laboratory 
experiments. 
Finally, an interesting case is reviewed by Damasio et al. (1994). They examine the 
extraordinary case of Phineas Gage and compare his brain lesion with other patients with similar 
frontal lobe traumas. The researchers find that people with such malfunctions are unable to 
make rational decisions in personal and, more interestingly, social context, and their ability to 
process emotions is also damaged, while abstract thinking, problem solving and calculations 
are intact. For this reason, the authors argue that emotions and the regions of the brain 
responsible for them participate in decision-making, especially within the social domain. 
All this being said, the way human beings evolved as a social species, the development 
of our cognition, and the structure of our brain, all point to the major role emotions play in 
decision making processes put in a social context. 
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Previous laboratory experiments involving emotions 
When investigating altruistic models in public good provision, Andreoni (1990) coined 
the term “warm-glow giving”. He argues that people gain utility from the act of giving, 
expressed as a positive emotional feeling experienced when helping others. Therefore, the 
author presents an intermediate approach involving impure altruism. 
Further light on how emotions influence our decisions has been shed by several 
experimental studies that investigate the link between emotions, cooperation and punishment. 
Haselhuhn and Mellers (2005) claim that people possess a taste of fairness and often act in a 
way to maximize their social utility, i.e. their subjective utility relative to others. They consider 
emotions in economic games as pleasure derived from the individual attitude towards social 
fairness and expressed by the ranking of preferences (payoff). The bigger the pleasure from fair 
distribution of resources, the greater the chance of cooperative behavior. Furthermore, Pillutla 
and Murnighan (1996) concluded that feelings of anger increase the probability of rejecting 
unfair offers. Lopez et al. (2012) suggest that the need to avoid social disapproval or gain social 
approval can stimulate cooperative behavior. They investigated whether emotions, such as 
shame and guilt, can be more effective than standard regulatory mechanisms and found that 
emotional pressure performed better than punishing with high economic penalties. Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) claim that negative emotional responses to free-riding behavior lie at the basis 
of successful cooperation. Players are ready to punish defectors even though the punishment 
imposes costs on them. The authors argue that this is caused by a sense of fairness. Furthermore, 
they confirm the wide spread notion in the literature that subject who play a finitely repeated 
game matched with the same peers tend to cooperate more than those who are matched with 
different players after each sequential round. Again, this laboratory result supports the role 
social connections play in achieving cooperation. Goeree and Holt (2000) shed more light on 
the reasons behind the discrepancy between Nash offers and actual offers in an ultimatum game. 
They outline the role of sense of fairness and equity considerations in the utility functions of 
the individuals, as well as the presence of noise, i.e. irrational behavior, and show that these 
two factors can be included in a general model. 
Other studies (Koford, 2003; Anderson et al., 2008; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) have 
investigated how inequality and demands for fairness impact collective action and cooperation. 
It becomes clear that the sense of inequity has important psychological effects. Even though the 
exact emotions are not mentioned explicitly by these researchers, one can claim that negative 
emotional responses reduce the tendency for cooperation, which is consistent with the literature. 
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Hegtvedt (1990) also highlights the importance of social context and the relative status when it 
comes to emotions provoked by an unfair exchange. Consequently, the sense of fairness and its 
inherent emotional responses are able to impact decision-making with respect to cooperative 
behavior and willingness to redistribute goods. 
Other papers analyze the subsequent impact of transient emotions on behavior. For their 
part, Andrade and Ariely (2009) argue that incidental emotions have not only brief influence 
on current decision making, but last longer since subsequent context-related decisions are based 
on the previous ones because of behavioral consistency. They conducted an experiment in 
which participants were first exposed to a certain emotional frame and then played economic 
games. Their findings clearly support their hypothesis. Colasante et al. (2017) use music and 
images to provoke incidental emotions in an experiment involving emotional states and their 
impact on risk aversion. They find that the treatment effects do make the subjects more risk 
averse, exhibiting high susceptibility for the first lottery presented to the subjects with a 
diminishing influence thereafter. Their results support my expectation that transient emotional 
stimulus can influence behavior in a one-shot game for a short period of time after the framing 
effect has been induced. 
 
The growing body of laboratory experiments tries to capture and quantify compound 
behavioral categories such as sense of fairness, altruism, desire to punish and reward, and 
decision consistency – all these being factors that cannot be dismissed when trying to explain 
social behavior. Inducing the right emotion and its relevance in the research context is a 
challenge many experimentalists try to address. I claim that my own study can contribute to 
that matter by showing the link between altruism and positive emotions. 
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The power of social networks 
The next few pages intend to offer a brief overview of social connections and their impact 
on altruism and cooperation. One cannot study the mechanism without knowing the context in 
which it operates.  
In their inspiring book “Connected” (2009), Fowler and Christakis speak of “homo 
dictyous” (ch.7, 221) – the “network man”. They argue that we, being a social species, not just 
form groups, but form networks, and our connections to these networks considerably define our 
happiness and life satisfaction. By taking the well-being of the others into account, friendship 
and loyalty wins over selfishness. Many game theoretic experiments prove this notion – subjects 
give something back, inconsistent with classical economy theory that predicts different 
outcomes. The explanation lies deep into our genes. Throughout the relentless struggle, he have 
gone through, called evolution, only those groups with the most fit social networks will win the 
game and survive. But what constitutes a “fit social network”? The Dunbar’s number, which is 
also quoted in the book (see Chapter 7), suggests that the cognitive limit of people with whom 
an individual can form and maintain stable social relationships is around 150. If this number is 
correct, then it is quite possible that people may distinguish between people outside of this circle 
and inside of it when deciding the amount of cooperation or altruism they are willing to offer. 
Hence, commitment and “share my victory” behavior can vary quantitatively depending on the 
other person’s social position or role related to the Dunbar’s number, for example. 
Several graphs in Fowler and Christakis’ book depict the complex dynamics of social 
networks. But if one wants to analyze this complexity, one will need an appropriate model. 
Such model is developed by Faust and Skvoretz (2002) to compare different social groups based 
on the correspondence analysis for similarities among diverse networks. By drawing a sample 
of 42 networks from four kinds of species, they find that what defines similarities, is the kind 
of the relation, not the species. Furthermore, positive and negative relations tend to be mutual, 
while transitivity is predominantly linked to positive relations among the group members, thus, 
suggesting a positive “spill-over effect” in this particular set of networks. More light on the 
structure of social networks is shed by Adams (1967). He analyzed the main components of 
social relations and argues that there is “a significant linkage between consensus, affection, and 
interaction” (p.65).  Adams contributed to the discussion by suggesting the term “positive 
concern”. Positive concern can be understood as an amalgamation between “need and 
obligation”  and “long-term involvement and continuing interest”(p. 66). The author outlined 
some factors that are able to further the development of positive concern in interpersonal 
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relationships – common experience, gratitude for help, and sharing in the same life crises. On 
my behalf, I argue that the opposite causal direction is also plausible – positive concern could 
be a potential accelerator of prosocial behavior expressed as a desire to share and help those 
one is committed to. 
Lawler and Thye (1999) systematize six different approaches that address the role of 
emotions in social exchange theory. They distinguish between negotiated and reciprocal 
exchanges, and highlight that the former is used to negotiate the terms of trade between two 
parties in a formal, unemotional and dispassionate context, whereas the latter allows for more 
emotional expressions and norms to emerge. The success of relations formed by reciprocal 
exchange is more sensitive to the presence of emotions. However, in order to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the actor in social exchange, one needs to consider more 
characteristics in addition to the rational, information-processing, reward-maximizing actor 
suggested by social exchange theory. For this reason, Lawler (2001) proposes the affect theory 
of social exchange which introduces an actor that responds emotionally to exchange. The main 
property of this theory postulates that joint activities among members of a group produce 
negative and positive emotions; they, in turn, shape individual-collective ties; the strength of 
these ties determines prosocial behavior within the group. This idea of emotions and social 
networks working together corresponds to my experimental design pretty well since I intend to 
shed more light exactly on how positive emotions operate in different social contexts (groups). 
Analyzing the interpersonal relationships from a different scientific perspective, Becker 
(1974) adopted an economic and mathematical approach. The main concept of his analysis is 
"social income," or “the sum of a person's own income (his earnings, etc.) and the monetary 
value to him of the relevant characteristics of others, which I call his social environment” (p. 
1090). Hence, people gain utility by redistributing part of their income to other members of the 
“family”.  
The concept of social connections or interactions with the others has been tested in 
laboratory settings as well. For example, Buchan et al. (2009) argue that large-scale cooperation 
(for example, global environmental issues) among people from different countries or 
geographical regions rises when a particular individual is considered to be more “globalized”, 
thus, embracing more cosmopolitan than parochial motives.  In fact, globalization creates two 
vital prerequisites for the emergence of social connections -sense of common belonging (we all 
face the same problems or settings) and familiarity (we know something about the others- they 
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are not perfect strangers anymore). Basically, the network of the “tribe” is enlarged on a global 
level, but it still embodies the same features.  
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) tackle the question whether anonymity matters in public 
goods experiments. They find that the identification of the subjects and the information about 
their contributions increase the average level of endowments for the public good by 59% 
compared to the usual public goods experiment. Only when these two effects are combined, 
socially is optimal behavior highly encouraged. The experiment reveals another interesting 
result: information alone does not give rise to contributions relative to the control treatment, 
but identification alone has a slight positive effect. This finding suggests that the (quasi-
)connection built through the received information about the other participants can lead to a 
behavioral change, as hypothesized in my experiment. 
Another interesting study that deals with identity revelation effects is presented by Wilson 
and Eckel (2006). They look at the role attractiveness play when trusting strangers and find that 
people who meet certain beauty standards enjoy higher levels of confidence in a game involving 
trust and reciprocity. However, more attractive trusters tend to be subjects of higher levels of 
punishment as well – when they do not meet the expectations of the trustees. Hence, the authors 
suggest the existence of “beauty premium” and “beauty penalty”. Can this mean that the faces 
we choose to be our friends or acquaintances become more attractive to us throughout time or 
is it vice versa – we tend to include more attractive looking people in our social circle? Of 
course, the aim of this study is not to explore this relationship, but if it holds true, then one 
possible explanation why we trust attractive people more than others, and, eventually, why we 
want to make friends with them, could be related to, as Wilson and Eckel suggest, expression 
of good genes and a marker for social status. Whatever the reason, the authors stress on the 
importance of cognitive constraints, such as attractiveness bias, when it comes to decision-
making and strategic behavior. Furthermore, this experiment shows that when the anonymity 
condition is violated, the outcomes can be very different. 
Finally, the example of how emotional attachment and familiarity can achieve 
cooperation in small communities was showed by Ostrom (1990). She examined a few cases of 
small villages and how their members managed to maintain continuous commitment with low 
sanctions and high level of compliance. Long-term interaction and the resulting social 
relationships among the members created an emotional setting driven by the established social 
norms in which public shame was more effective than fines. This is the baseline that ensured 
the successful management of the common pool resources in these cases. 
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The evidence presented in this part let us summarize that the nature of social networks, 
their scale, and the dynamics of relations are capable of shaping pro-social behavior. If the 
characteristics of a network are changed or new ones are introduced, this may lead to a different 
behavioral outcome. Therefore, studying the way people connect with each other as a core 
feature of cooperation, is essential for understanding the mechanism at work. 
 
Summary 
Without pretending for complete awareness of the literature, I argue that my study can 
fill the following research gaps. First, most of the laboratory experiments so far focus on the 
negative emotional spectrum, whereas the positive emotions remain neglected. For sure, they 
could also predict cooperation or altruism, therefore, it is worth studying them. Second, the 
reactions of the participants in each experiment may vary, depending not only on the 
information they have about the other subjects, but also on the type of interaction they have 
with them outside of the experiment. Thus, bringing real social relations in the lab and studying 
them isolated from the compound social world, could allow us to arrive at more thorough 
conclusions about altruism and other types of pro-social behavior. Third, how the emotional 
responses change with respect to the inclusion of familiarity is another issue my experiment 
will attempt to address.  
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Methodology 
 
The experiment’s design 
For the purposes of my study I developed a game theoretical lab experiment by recreating 
a classical economic game – the “Dictator Game”.  The standard game consists of two subjects 
matched in pairs. One of them is assigned the role of the “dictator” and receives certain quantity 
of money from the experimenter. Then he or she has to decide how much to offer to the other 
subject, even if that amount is zero. The second player has no other option but to accept the 
offer. I chose this particular design, because it allows for “pure” altruism to take place, since, 
first, the “dictators” are normatively not obliged to redistribute anything from their earnings 
and second, they don’t expect reciprocity to follow. This makes their pro-social behavior more 
“pure”, in a sense that it is not driven by any future benefits from the interaction with the other 
player while playing the game.   
On the other hand, the prediction of classical economic theory that individuals are 
motivated solely out of self-interest and should keep all the monetary rewards for themselves 
should prevent any form of altruism to develop. Contrary to expectations, however, dictators 
do usually redistribute a certain amount. The estimates vary: for, example Forsythe at al. (1994; 
as quoted by Guala and Mittone, 2010) report that 20% of the endowments are redistributed on 
average, whereas Engel (2010) computes the mean for 616 treatments to be 28.35 %. Mueller 
(2003) looks at fairness norms as a form of voluntary redistribution. He cites Eichenberger and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1997) who, in a series of experiments, found that dictators give about one 
third of the cake to the other person. Two of the predominant motives supported as possible 
explanations by the literature are sense of fairness and concern about others’ welfare (Guala 
and Mittone, 2010). In order to reduce the impact of these two stimuli, I introduce competition 
in my game. By doing so, I intend to isolate the effects of my two treatments, and if any changes 
occur, this should be more due to mood induction or familiarity than to inherent norms of 
equality and compassion.   
For the purposes of my research, I recruited students from the University of Tampere to 
participate. The sample size I aim to reach should be between 50 and 60 subjects, considering 
the budget constraint and the availability of persons willing to take part. The active participation 
of more people is crucial in order to achieve robust results, because I investigate two different 
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treatments and compare them to the baseline. However, the proposed number of subjects is still 
not sufficient enough, and small sample bias should be taken into consideration, but these issues 
will be discussed in the Discussion section.  
In the next few paragraphs I elaborate the experimental procedure. The participants are 
placed into four subgroups:  
 control group – no emotional inducement, anonymity, participants are randomly 
matched;  
 “emotional effect only” group - the subjects are exposed to the emotional framing, they 
do not know their partners, randomly matched again;  
 “familiarity” group  - everybody knows his or her partner well, but mood induction 
techniques are not used;  
 ”emotions plus familiarity” group - the subjects will play against their friends, and 
emotional stimuli are used.   
The experiment itself consists of six sessions with a different number of pairs in each 
session. The subjects enter two rooms that are separated by a wall but have a common door 
between them. Each individual is matched with another one from the second room. These 
settings allow the experimenters to watch the pairs, while the subjects cannot communicate with 
each other. First, the instructions4 are read aloud by the experimenter, clarifications are given, 
and questions are answered. Then the participants are asked to play a game similar to the one 
called ‘Memory’. Everybody starts simultaneously when the signal is given. They compete 
against each other to see who can find more quickly all the four pairs from a set of cards, lying 
face down on the desk in front of them. The experimenters observe them and write down the 
number of the winner from each pair. Then, depending on the results, the winners from the 
Memory game are assigned the role of dictator and the losers have to play as peers. The dictators 
receive 10 euros and have the right to keep them all or to redistribute something to the peers. 
Special sheets5 are handed out with the number of the other player, the role each participant 
has, and a blank space for the amount redistributed. Then the dictators make their decisions, the 
sheets are collected by the experimenters, and final payoffs are paid. They amount to a 5 euro 
show-up fee, plus the outcome of the Dictator game. At the end, each participant has to fill in a 
                                                          
4 For the Rules of the Game sheet, see the Appendix. 
5 For the Game sheet, see the Appendix. 
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short questionnaire6, and the experiment is over. The entire procedure takes no more than 30 
minutes. 
One of the framing effects lies in the design of the cards they have to match7 in the 
Memory game. For the control group, these are simple, neutral images of everyday household 
objects. For the treatment groups, however, the images aim to provoke certain emotions such 
as happiness, joy, sense of belonging and friendship (for example: kittens and puppies, babies, 
happy faces, or friends having fun). When choosing the pictures, I used a picture database 
compiled by professional photographers, designers and psychologists in order to be sure that 
the visual message is universal and captures the desired emotions. Speaking of the effectiveness 
of such priming techniques, as Mayer et al. (1995) find, happy mood induction can further raise 
happiness among subjects, since usually people come to experiments in a good mood. In 
relation to that, by conducting this experiment, I put my own technique to the test whether it 
can be effective not only in provoking positive emotions, but also to create a genuine version 
of naturally occurring mood (Mayer et al., 1995). 
As of the familiarity effect, the same images are used, but the only difference is that the 
participants are not randomly matched and they know their partner very well. For this part of 
the experiment, I ask everyone interested in my study to bring up a friend to play with. Those 
people who come for the “friendship” treatments will not be informed about the “anonymity” 
sessions held in different days. 
 
Research methods and models 
Epistemologically speaking, my approach is positivist in the way that it uses empirical 
data to support or refute a formulated hypothesis by using statistical and econometrical tools. 
Therefore, my method of analysis is strictly statistical. My analysis consists of two major parts: 
1. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA test (or a t-test) for statistically significant difference 
between the subgroups. 
2. Multiple regression models to analyze the impact of my treatment effects (the 
independent variables) on the dependent variable – the redistribution amounts, i.e. the 
altruistic behavior- while controlling for specific effects suggested by the literature. 
                                                          
6 For the Questionnaire form, see the Appendix. 
7 The neutral and emotional images used in this experiment can be found in the Appendix. 
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My data collection process, i.e. the laboratory experiment, which details were presented 
in the previous part of the current chapter, means that I will compile my own set of primary 
data. The core unit of my analysis is the monetary amount redistributed by the dictator to the 
peer. The design of my experiment implies that I lose on degrees of freedom, since I obtain one 
unit of observation from two participants. Therefore, the statistics derived should be treated 
with precautions, since small sample bias should be taken into consideration. However, if there 
is any statistically significant effect in my study, the results from the analysis shall allow us to 
draw inferences in accordance with my hypotheses. I formulate them as follows: 
1. The null hypothesis claims that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
treatment, i.e. the emotional framing does not contribute to an increase in altruism. Nor 
does friendship achieves higher levels of pro-social behavior.  
2. The alternative hypothesis supports the statement that our intuitive or emotional attitude 
actually plays a significant role in deciding the personal amount of contribution to the 
community’s sake. Furthermore, this effect is also strengthened by familiarity. This 
implies that there is a statistically significant effect in the treatment groups compared to 
the control group. I do not dare to hypothesize about the scale of the discrepancies 
between the two treatments prior to the experiment. 
3. A third hypothesis can be formulated as a consequence of the alternative one. It states 
that emotions should have a bigger impact when the object of emotional projection or 
association is well-known to the subject.  
Mathematically speaking, I hypothesize that the control group mean, μ0, should be 
smaller than the means of the two treatments (emotional framing and friendship), i.e. μ0 < μ1 
and μ0 < μ2. Furthermore, the combined effect should be even higher, which means that μ1 < 
μ1+2 and μ2 < μ1+2. Moreover, not much can be said about the difference between μ1 and μ2 – 
we need to “let the data speak for themselves”. These two treatments embody completely 
different inducements which makes the outcome unpredictable. Nevertheless, it is worth finding 
out whether the individual mood or the social context furthers altruism more successfully. This 
opposition is also an object of the current study, along with the synergy between these two 
effects. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I use the single-factor ANOVA test (also known as F-
test) for the differences among group means. It is a reliable way to measure the effects of various 
treatments on specific subset from the sample by estimating the ratio between the variance 
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between treatments and the variance within treatments. The higher this ratio, the more 
statistically significant the statistic is. This means that the observed variance is in fact due to 
the factors used in the study. The reason why the F-test is preferred to a simple t-test when 
dealing with more than two groups is because it is independent of scaling error. This implies 
that it keeps the Type I error at the 0.05 cutoff regardless of how many times the test is being 
ran, which is not the case with a series of t-tests that will produce a cumulative error. Thus, one-
way ANOVA test is a suitable statistical model for my study. Nonetheless, it is an omnibus test 
statistic and cannot provide any clue which particular groups differ from each other, only that 
at least two groups are different. Further post hoc tests are required to solve this issue.  
The second part of my data analysis consists of a few regression models. I am interested 
in how my effects fit together with some other control variables proposed by the literature. My 
dependent variable is then the redistribution of money, Yi, each dictator has given to the other 
player. The regression models looks like that: 
 
Yi = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β1,2X1,2 + γtCONTROLSn,t + ε, 
where α is the constant, β1, β2, β1,2 and γt  are coefficients to be estimated, and ε is the error term. 
X1, X2 and X1,2 are the variables of interest, the emotional inducement, the familiarity, and the 
combined effect of the two respectively. All these three variables are coded as dummy variables. 
CONTROLSn,t  is a n-by-t matrix of control variables with n rows (numbers of observations) 
and t columns (the number of control factors included in the model). The control variables I 
decided to consider in my model are the following: 
 Gender – several studies point to a difference between sexes when it comes to altruism 
(Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). Again, I code this 
variable using dummies. 
 Education – Frank et al. (1993) report that students on economics tend to be more selfish 
due to their exposure to self-interest models. A dummy variable is also suitable for this 
case. If the subjects study economics as their major they are coded with 1, and 0 
otherwise. 
 Income – I control for the socio-economic level each participant belongs to. The subjects 
have to place themselves or their families in one of the ten income deciles, thus, making 
this variable, an ordinal one. 
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 Political views – I use a ten point left-wing/right-wing scale to control for any 
differences depending on their political orientation, with 1, being extremely left-wing, 
and 10, being extremely right-wing. 
 Religiosity- even though most of my subjects are international students, hence, coming 
from different denominations, religions or religious groups, the extent to which they 
consider themselves spiritual is of main interest here, and more precisely, do they 
observe the religious norms in a way that stimulates them to embrace pro-social norms 
and behavior (Donahue and Benson, 1995). For this control variable I use a 1 to 5 scale, 
with 1- atheist and 5- true believer.  
 Culture – multiple studies (Roth et al., 1995; Henrich, 2000) outline the importance of 
cultural differences when analyzing cooperative behavior. In my study, the subjects will 
be asked about their nationality. Then I use Hofstede’s (2001, 2010) “Dimensions of 
National Culture” model8. Two of these dimensions can be implemented in my model. 
I group the countries of origin based on their “Masculinity versus Femininity” and 
“Individualism versus Collectivism” scores. The former distinguishes between more 
competitive and aggressive cultures, and more consensual and cooperative ones. The 
latter divides societies into individualistic and independent cultures, and into collectivist 
cultures with tightly-knit social connections. These two features will be included into 
two separate models in order to compare their goodness of fit. I argue that these 
variables provide an excellent classification of the subjects’ cultural backgrounds with 
regard to the purposes of my research. I code these two covariates with 1 for feminine 
or collectivist cultures, and 0 for masculine and individualistic cultures. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Methodology, data and any relevant information can be accessed at https://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html  
According to the website’s rules, reference is made to the original sources. 
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Having a small sample, inevitably leads to bias in the coefficient estimates. Therefore, I 
do not dare to argue about any strict significance or generalizability. The logic behind running 
a couple of regression models is to observe how the treatments from my experiment fit together 
with some other variables discussed in the literature. The next section of the current work 
presents the results, interprets the statistics and provides possible explanations of the findings. 
 
Ethics 
Ethical concerns are crucial, especially when it comes to provoking and investigating 
people’s emotions. I follow the general principles of the Declaration of Helsinki – autonomy 
(informed consent); beneficence; non-maleficence; justice; anonymity. The participation will 
be entirely voluntary with an informed consent of the subjects9. The entire experiment will be 
completely anonymous, i.e. no personal data is required to be collected or stored that may reveal 
the identity of the participants. In terms of beneficence, I argue that a better understanding of 
how our mind works in its entirety is vital for the development of social sciences. Since feelings 
are very sensitive and personal topic, I focus on provoking only positive emotional responses 
without any risk of causing harm or deceiving the subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For the Consent form, see the Appendix. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
In this section of the current work, I present the findings suggested by my experiment. I 
organize this chapter in four separate parts. First, I provide some descriptive statistics and 
comment them. Then I look at the results from the t-test and ANOVA. The third part deals with 
some regression models and addresses the issues associated with them. The final part, the 
discussion, provides explanations, comments on the difficulties and the shortcomings of the 
study and makes suggestions about future work. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The experiment took place in the campus of University of Tampere (UTA). Six sessions 
with different number of participants were conducted in March 2017. Most of the subjects were 
Bachelor and Master degree students from UTA, but also students from the other two 
universities in the city – Tampere University of Technology (TUT) and Tampere University of 
Applied Sciences (TAMK). Eight high school students also participated in one of the sessions. 
The recruitment was done using the e-mail list of the international students’ community at UTA. 
Some participants were reached by posting in social media websites, and a special event was 
created in Facebook. Another group of subjects (especially for the friendship treatment) was 
contacted using personal social networks and word of mouth. The entire recruitment period 
took two weeks of intense communication. 
In total, seventy people participated in my laboratory experiment, which makes 35 pairs 
and 35 units of observation. This is due to the feature of my design – the dependent variable of 
interest is the part of the endowment redistributed by the dictators to the peers. Speaking of 
demographic characteristics, the age of the participants is between 18 and 26 years old, 57% of 
them are female. All of them come from very different majors – mostly humanities, computer 
science, media, education, and engineering10. Only five persons reported that they study 
economics or business. A vast majority of them were unfamiliar with this kind of experiments. 
Their cultural backgrounds are very diverse as well: international students from all over the 
world were recruited. However, I can identify two subsamples of people with the same 
                                                          
10 8 subjects had a high school education. 
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nationality: 8 Korean students and 16 Finnish university and high school students.  These two 
groups are dispersed among the different treatments. 
The average payoff earned by all the participants is 10, 70 euros. For their part, the peers 
earned 8, 66 euros on average, whereas the dictators (as expected) left the lab with slightly more 
money – 11, 81 euros. This final payoff contains both the show-up fee and the outcome of the 
Dictator game. 
The main variable of interest in my study is the redistribution amount. The sample mean 
is equal to 3, 19 euros (SE: 0,322) with a standard deviation of 1, 91. The range is 5 with a 
min=0 and a max=5. The median is 4 and the mode is 5, which means that the distribution itself 
is left-tailed (Skew[X]= -0, 496). This is visible from Graph 1: 
Graph 1: Sample Histogram 
 
 
 
The histogram confirms the descriptive statistics’ parameters. The distribution is 
concentrated on the right side around 3, 4 and mostly 5. The median values 1 and 2 exhibit the 
lowest frequency, whereas there is a slight peak at 0. Since the sample is rather small it is worth 
looking at the kurtosis in order to identify outliers that may influence the analysis. In our case, 
Kurt[X] = -1, 268 which is less than the kurtosis of the normal distribution (Kurt[X] = 3). 
Therefore, one might argue that this distribution is platykurtic, i.e. it produces fewer and less 
extreme outliers. Overall, the data in my sample does not follow a normal distribution which 
means that statistical inferences regarding the population should be taken with consideration11. 
                                                          
11 The shortcomings of the sample will be thoroughly discussed in the following sections. 
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The next step in our analysis is to take a closer look at each treatment separately to identify 
any trends with regard to the effects we are interested in. Graph 2 shows the histogram of the 
four groups in my sample: the control group; the group with positive images and anonymity; 
the group with friendship and neutral images; the group that combines these two treatments. 
Graph 2: Histograms of the treatments 
 
 
 
The control group exhibits a U-shaped distribution with more observations on the two 
extremes. The observations in the Emotions treatment form a uniform distribution without any 
particular pattern. The two treatments that involve familiarity, however, are both skewed to the 
left, thus, following the distribution of the sample (or the sample distribution itself is shaped by 
the effect of these two treatments). Again, we observe a cluster around 5. Interestingly, nobody 
decide to give nothing (0 euros) to the other person in the friendship treatments as opposed to 
the other two treatments. 
 The average contribution per treatment reveals some intriguing results. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for each group in the sample. The control group (the 
baseline case) mean is highly consistent with previous experiments discussed in the 
Methodology chapter. The “friendship” treatments have considerably higher means than the 
“stranger” treatments which proves my hypothesis that introducing social networks will have a 
positive impact on altruism.  
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The positive emotions, though, seem to have, in fact, a negative effect on redistribution 
in contrast to what was anticipated. The means for the two treatments are lower than their 
counterparts, if we compare “strangers” to “friends” treatments. This implies that the emotional 
inducement technique did not manage to achieve higher levels of pro-social behavior in my 
experiment. Without running any tests, one could argue that the alternative hypothesis should 
be rejected in favor of the null hypothesis. In light of that, more comprehensive analysis of this 
issue will be presented in the next section.  
The medians are higher than the means (except for the Emotions treatment) which 
confirms the left skewness observed on Graph 2. The modes, excluding the Emotions group 
again, are the same for the other three treatments and equal five, which is also the maximum 
amount redistributed in my sample. This means that the subjects showed the inherent sense of 
fairness discussed in the literature. What matters here is that in the “friendship” treatments, the 
numbers gather around the 50-50 partitioning in comparison with the other two treatments. The 
argument is strengthened by the evidently lower standard deviations presented in the fourth 
column.  
All this taken into account – higher means and medians, modes = 5, and less variance – 
leads us to the claim that friendship did trigger more pro-social behavior and sense of fairness. 
As of the positive emotions, the results are controversial. 
Table 1: Summary of redistributions: control group and main effects 
 
 
 
In order to examine these four sets of data and their distributions graphically, box plots 
are shown below. Again, the higher medians indicate the effect when familiarity is introduced. 
The two graphs on the right depict the left skewness of the distributions. In each group there is 
Treatments Mean Median Mode SD N
Control 2,85 3,75 5 2,381 10
Emotions 2,31 2,25 0/2,5* 1,926 8
Friends 4,13 5 5 1,458 8
Emo+Friends 3,5 4 5 1,436 9
Total: 35
Summary of redistributions
* both values appear most frequently
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one outlier: two of the dictators decided to redistribute only 1 euro. In general, these two box 
plots complete the histograms presented in Graph 2. 
Graph 3: Box plots 
 
 
 
The Emotions group appears to be more normally distributed. Yet this may be misleading, 
since the distribution is clearly uniform and the box plot does not account for that. Similarly for 
the baseline, where most of the data is grouped near the tails. Nonetheless, the box plots are 
useful to compare the differences between the four treatments, rather than to serve as a source 
of evidence for their distributions. It becomes clear that regardless of the outliers in the 
friendship treatments (and because of the small sample their relative weight is considerable), 
the two medians are higher and most of the data is visibly clustered near the maximum (5 euros). 
Apparently, there is an effect which statistical significance must to be tested. In the next section, 
I run different statistical tests regarding my hypotheses, and comment on the results and on the 
rationale behind using exactly them. To sum up, the descriptive statistics provided us with very 
interesting results and a few questions to be answered in the coming pages. Furthermore, they 
shed light on the peculiarities of the data that need to be taken into consideration when drawing 
inferences from this sample. 
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Hypothesis testing 
In this section, I present the results from the hypothesis tests I decided to run. Again, my 
hypotheses state that: first, positive emotions do increase pro-social behavior; second, 
familiarity matters when it comes to altruism; third, these two effects combined should produce 
synergy and lead to even higher levels of contribution. Since I have four groups, the design of 
my experiment suggests that an ANOVA test is an appropriate way to test the significance of 
these effects. However, this requires the sample to be divided into four parts with less than (or 
equal to) ten observations in each of them. Table 2 reports the result from the ANOVA test:  
Table 2: ANOVA: single factor test 
 
 
 
The p-value is dramatically bigger than the 5% cutoff which makes the statistic 
insignificant. Nevertheless, this does not immediately imply that there is no effect whatsoever.  
One can speculate that it is rather due to the fact that the model loses on power because 
of the few observations in each group. To account for this possibility, we need to change the 
structure of the data in order to gain more degrees of freedom. I do this by joining the two 
“friendship” treatments together, on the hand, and then merging the two “emotional” 
treatments, on the other. Ultimately, we obtain two major groups to compare using a standard 
t-test. It is acceptable to do so, if there is no statistically significant difference between the two 
subgroups that are being combined. And this is exactly the case with the two “friendship” 
treatments. However, the p-value for the t-statistic, when the two “emotional” treatments are 
compared, is significant at the 10% cutoff. This difference is mainly attributable to the presence 
of familiarity in the second “emotional” subgroup. Even if we merge them and run a t-test 
without relating to this problem, there is no statistically significant effect caused by the 
emotional inducement. All this being said, we can refute the alternative hypothesis and accept 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between 15,17410714 3 5,058035714 1,446903 0,24813 2,911334
Within 108,36875 31 3,495766129
Total 123,5428571 34
ANOVA: Single Factor
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the null hypothesis which states that positive emotional framing does not lead to higher levels 
of altruism.12 
As it became clear from the mean differences in the previous section, familiarity 
undeniably increased the average redistribution. Table 3 shows the result from the t-test when 
the two “friendship” treatments are compared to the other two treatments, which I call 
“stranger” for simplicity, regardless of the emotional inducement. 
Table 3: T-test for “Friends vs. Stranger” case 
 
 
 
Since I hypothesize an increase in altruism, it is more accurate to look at the one-tail p-
value which is equal to 0, 031806, and thus, the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 13 This 
implies that the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternative one – the 
introduction of familiarity in my experiment does stimulate pro-social behavior, resulting in 
more redistribution.  
Of course, before accepting these results, one should question the reliability of the test 
itself. The t-test comparing the means of two independent samples has to meet three major 
assumptions: independence of the data; equal variances; normality. 
                                                          
12 The matter with the emotions and the direction of the means will be addressed in the Discussion part. 
13 The two-tail test remains highly significant at the 10% cutoff, but the one-tail critical value responds better to 
my hypothesis. 
Stranger Friend
Mean 2,611111 3,7941
Variance 4,604575 2,0643
Observations 18 17
Hypothesized Mean Diff. 0
df 30
t Stat -1,92609
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,031808
t Critical one-tail 1,697261
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,063615
t Critical two-tail 2,042272
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal 
Variances
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The first conditions is met because each unit of observation is sampled independently 
from the others. The second condition is not violated for two reasons. First, if the two sample 
sizes are equal, this makes the Student’s t-test robust to the presence of unequal variances 
(Markowski and Markowski, 1990). Second, I use a modified version of the original t-test that 
accounts for the disparity of the variances. The third condition, however, requires the use of a 
normality test. Even though the t-test is robust to small and medium deviations from these three 
assumption (Bland, 1995; p.166), I argue that the check for normality is necessary, since we 
deal with a very small sample and, therefore, need to be careful for misleading results or biases. 
Whether the two samples follow a normal distribution, can be tested either graphically using 
normal quantile plot (Q-Q plot) or running a normality test such as Shapiro–Wilk or 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, both available in SPSS. The following Graph 4 shows the box plots 
of the two categories (samples).  
Graph 4: Box plots - “Strangers vs. Friends” case. 1=”Stranger”; 2=”Friend”. 
 
 
The blox plots suggest that the two distributions are not only different from each other, 
but that they do not follow the normal distribution. In the “stranger” case, the distribution has 
a W-shape, whereas the distribution of the “friend” group is obviously skewed to the left14. 
                                                          
14 This statement is based on the histograms presented in Graph 2. A new histogram is not shown to avoid 
redundancies. 
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Additionally, the box plots reveal the impact of familiarity on the redistribution amounts: the 
median for group 2 is substantially higher than the one for group 1 (approximately by 1,5 euros). 
The next graph depicts the actual Normal Q-Q plots that compare the observed data with 
the data we would expect to see if they were normally distributed. The solid line represents the 
normal distribution. Any points that stray far from the line tell us that the normality assumption 
is violated. The Detrended Normal Q-Q plot is another version of the same concept, but it shows 
the magnitude and the direction of deviation with reference to the normal distribution expressed 
by the horizontal line. 
Graph 5: Normal and Detrended Q-Q plots. 1=”Stranger”; 2=”Friend”. 
 
 
Even though the deviations from the normal distribution are not very large for both 
groups, we observe on the Detrended Normal Q-Q plot for group 1 that there is a negative trend 
in the direction of the deviation. Thus, the graphs suggest that the use of a normality test is 
advisable in this case.  
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When dealing with small samples any outlier or deviation from the normal distribution 
should be taken cautiously, therefore, I present the results from two normality tests in order to 
account for that.  
Table 4: Normality tests. 1=”Stranger”; 2=”Friend”. 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test. 
Both tests are highly significant at the 1% cutoff which is a serious argument for a violation of 
the normality assumption. Certainly, the p-values suppose, but does not prove that the data is 
not normally distributed, in reality. For example, the S-W test is extremely sensitive to minor 
deviations even for large samples. That is why the scientific background of the study and the 
researcher’s own judgement should be regarded when deciding on the significance of these 
tests. 
I argue that there is enough evidence to conclude that the data do not follow a normal 
distribution. First, the p-values are drastically smaller than the 0, 05 alpha level. Second, the 
two tests do not contradict each other. Third, the Q-Q plots distinctly show the deviations and 
their magnitudes and direction. Fourth, the histograms from the previous section also suggest 
that. Consequently, even though the t-test is robust to all but large violations from the three 
major assumptions (Bland, 1995; p.166), the statistic should be interpreted carefully because of 
the small sample bias. Therefore, in order to be more precise, one could run a permutation 
(randomization) test to confirm the results. This type of test creates quasi-distribution of sample 
mean-differences by replacing each value from the real sample with another actual value. Then 
the actual mean difference (or the estimated t-statistic for it) is compared to the quasi-
distribution of mean-differences (all possible alternative treatment assignments) in order to 
reject or accept the null hypothesis. The advantages of this randomization test is that it is non-
parametrical and the statistic is not obtained from a theoretical distribution, which means that 
it does not need to satisfy the same conditions. Furthermore, the test is useful when dealing with 
str_fr Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
1,00 ,256 18 ,003 ,807 18 ,002
2,00 ,270 17 ,002 ,800 17 ,002
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
Shapiro-Wilk
redis
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very small samples and with unbalanced designs, i.e. unequal number of observations in each 
subgroup or sample. However, even though it might be useful, I do not consider running 
permutation tests for the purposes of the current analysis.  
Regression models 
Even though regression analysis is the most preferable statistical tool when dealing with 
laboratory experiments that involve small samples, I decided to investigate how my treatment 
effects fit into a broader model including a few more control variables listed in the Methodology 
section. The reason why I am interested in running such linear models is because pro-social 
behavior often depends on multiple factors such as socio-economic status, religious views, 
cultural background and education. All these variables form the personality of each individual 
which, in turn, impacts the decision-making process in my experiment.  
I ran many models, but here I will present and comment the one with the best model 
selection criteria15 relative to the other ones. The output from the regression analysis is 
presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Generalized Linear Regression Model 
 
 
                                                          
15 I use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The model presented in this part is the one with the lowest AIC value 
compared to all other models. 
Lower Upper
Wald Chi-
Square df p-value
(Intercept) 1,981 1,5990 -1,153 5,115 1,535 1 ,215
friend_dummy 1,357 ,6195 ,143 2,571 4,799 1 ,028
[gender=1,00] ,037 ,5396 -1,021 1,094 ,005 1 ,946
[gender=2,00] 0
a
[edu=,00] 1,182 1,3458 -1,456 3,820 ,771 1 ,380
[edu=1,00] 0
a
[cult_fem=,00] 1,555 ,6345 ,311 2,798 6,003 1 ,014
[cult_fem=1,00
]
0
a
income ,029 ,1565 -,278 ,336 ,035 1 ,852
polit ,045 ,2049 -,356 ,447 ,049 1 ,824
relig -,662 ,3478 -1,344 ,020 3,621 1 ,057
(Scale) 2,169
b ,5185 1,358 3,465
Dependent Variable: redis
Model: (Intercept), friend_dummy, gender, edu, cult_fem, income, polit, relig
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.
b. Maximum likelihood estimate.
Generalized Linear Model (robust estimates)
Parameter B Std. Error
95% Wald 
Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test
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There are seven explanatory variables in my model. First, the variable of interest is coded 
as friend_dummy. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a single case comes 
from the “friendship” treatments and zero otherwise. As expected, in another model the dummy 
variable for emotional against neutral treatments appeared to be non-significant. The control 
variables in the model are: income, political views, religiosity, gender, education. As of the 
cultural background, the best fit was achieved when the covariate for masculine/feminine 
cultures was included16. Other culture variables, such as a dummy variable for Finland and 
another one for South Korea17, and the collectivist/individualistic societies, produced higher 
AIC values and were discarded.  
Most of the coefficients lack statistical significance and that is why they are not worth 
commenting. However, religiosity is on the verge of the 0, 05 alpha level, and culture seems to 
be significant, too. From the estimates in my model it is visible that deeper religious views are 
associated with less altruism. On the other hand, participants from more masculine (more selfish 
and competitive) cultures redistributed more compared to those who belong to more feminine 
ones. These two results contradict my initial hypotheses about these control variables. As 
pointed out in the literature, religious norms should inspire pro-social and altruistic behavior, 
whereas people from more collectivist and feminine cultural backgrounds should care more 
about equal distribution of goods.  
The independent variable of interest, though, is also significant at the 5% cutoff (p= 
0,028). Dictators who were placed in the “friendship” treatments gave 1, 357 euros more on 
average showing the strong effect familiarity has on redistribution.  
The results shown in Table 5 should be interpreted carefully. Four of the coefficients tend 
to be insignificant which leaves no space for speculations. Yet the p-values for culture and 
religiosity suggest that there is a statistically significant effect, even though it is the opposite of 
what has been hypothesized. With only 35 observations it is reasonable to think that these 
estimates are biased and more investigation (i.e. a larger sample) is needed to draw reliable 
statistical inferences. However, the explanatory variable of many interest does not lose on 
statistical significance and the regression analysis confirms the hypothesis tests discussed 
above. A power analysis could be appropriate in order to estimate the sample size required to 
obtain significant coefficients for these independent variables. For now, I argue that this model 
                                                          
16 Feminine cultures are coded as 1. For more information, refer to the Methodology section or Geert 
Hofstede’s webpage. 
17 Eight of the participants are South Korean which required the inclusion of such variable. 
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cannot tell us much about the above mentioned effects and I will base my further interpretation 
of the main effects in my experiment on the statistical evidence derived from the t-test. 
 
Discussion 
From the statistical analysis, it became clear that the two main treatment effects 
considered in my experiment have an opposite influence over the decision to redistribute in the 
dictator game. Despite being not statistically significant, positive emotions led to a decrease in 
the average donations made by the dictators regardless of the social context, whereas familiarity 
has a very strong impact on altruism. Referring back to my initial hypotheses, friendship did 
perform as expected – the participation of a member from the social network to which the 
dictator belongs matters substantially. Positive emotions, on the other hand, failed to stimulate 
higher levels of pro-social behavior and, therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Although the mean difference between the emotional and neutral treatments loses on statistical 
significance, the results are still intriguing and deserve attention. The notion that positive mood 
can cause less concern about the well-being of the others is worthy of further investigation. 
For this part, I intend to adopt an inductive-deductive approach when discussing the 
results from my research. In order to do so, I will present explanations coming from the subjects 
themselves, and then look at them and at the results from the perspective of some social and 
psychological theories and studies.  
During the last of phase of the experiment, the participants were asked to fill in a short 
questionnaire. After the demographics questions, which served as control variables in my 
regression models, the subjects had to write a few sentences concerning the outcome of the 
game. The dictators were asked to explain their decision, while the peers had to answer how 
they felt after they had seen the outcome. I will sort their answers into different themes and 
report the frequencies at which they occur. This information is valuable because it will reveal 
whether the participants were aware of the treatment manipulations in the experiment and 
thereby being biased in their actions. Furthermore, this approach will allow us to explore to 
what extent the behavior of the subjects is consistent with what we already know about altruism 
or cooperation, on the one hand, and the role of emotions in social interaction, on the other. 
The final step in this discussion is a commentary on the limitations of the current study 
and further research on the same topic. Some features in the design and the sampling process 
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could be improved in order to obtain more robust results. Of course, this raises questions not 
only about the current stance of my research, but also regarding some possible directions for a 
future work.  
Subjects’ self-reports 
It turned out that the dictators provided very intriguing justifications of their decisions. I 
extracted the main points from their answers and systematized them in a couple of themes that 
form three major categories. The graph below summarizes the findings. 
Graph 6: Dictators’ motivation 
 
The three main categories I would like to outline are: “noise”, “selfishness and 
anonymity”, and “fairness”. In the “noise” category I included four cases18 that do not fit in any 
of the other categories or themes and that are basically random. For example, one of the subjects 
admitted that she acted that way simply to tease her friend.  
The second category called “selfishness and anonymity” consists of four cases as well. 
Interestingly, these answers came only from those people who redistributed nothing and all of 
them were placed in the “stranger” treatment groups. They justified their actions to give zero 
euros because of two reasons: first, they felt privileged to take the entire cake because they were 
the winners; second, since they did not know the other person, this incentivized them to act 
selfishly. Therefore, we can conclude that the motivation behind selfishness in my experiment 
was driven by two factors: the competitive nature of the game and the anonymous settings.  
                                                          
18 One of them is missing data. 
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The former was sought as an outcome because by introducing competition, I intended to 
negate the inherent sense of fairness that people and then build up on that by means of my 
treatment effects. The latter has a curious counterargument in the ‘friendship” treatments: two 
of the subjects stated that the fact that they played against their friends influenced their decision. 
The predominant category in my sample (77%) is called “fairness”. The reason why I 
chose that word is straightforward – all of the participants who fall in this category used the 
words “fair”, “just”, and “equal” in the same sentence. However, the term “fairness” is pretty 
broad, therefore, I divided it into a few themes. The pie chart on the left shows how “fairness” 
is broken into subthemes. As we can see, there is an interesting divide among the dictators. 33% 
of them perceived fairness as equality, meaning that only a 50/50 split (or close to that) is fair 
and right. 30% of the subjects, though, believed that it is fair to keep more than the half, but 
still give something to the other person. This important finding sheds more light on how people 
react to hierarchy and what decisions they make when they are entitled – for some of them the 
victory meant nothing, for others it was important to distinguish themselves from the loser in 
terms of the final payoff.  
The third theme that occurs at 19% frequency is “fairness and norms”. These five subjects 
admitted that keeping all for yourself is not a justifiable behavior and that they do not want to 
be seen as “bad persons”. Furthermore, they explained that if they were completely selfish or 
gave too little, this would have made them feel “bad” or “sad”. What we observe is the 
understanding of fairness with regard to good social behavior and clear conscience. 
The last two themes have five persons all together. As I mentioned above, one of them is 
the “fairness and friendship”, meaning that, according to the respondents, one should treat one’s 
friends fairly. The other theme is “fairness and modesty”- some of the dictators believed that 
they won by chance since everything happened so quickly. Therefore, they thought that since 
both players put the same effort, the winner does not deserve to take more and that is why these 
dictators gave 5 euros.  
As of the peers, they had to express their feeling after the game. The way this group of 
subjects accepted the outcome of the game can gives us some insight into how they understood 
the terms “equal”, “fair”, and “privileged” while being in the other position.  
Graph 7 shows that more than the half of the subjects seem to be satisfied with the 
outcome. They accepted the decision made by the other player. In the cases where 5 euros were 
distributed, the peers described this as fair or were surprised by the generosity of the dictator. 
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When they received less than 5 euros, but more than 2 euros, their judgement of the situation 
was positive again, because it is acceptable to keep a bit more if you have won the game. 
Graph 7: Peers’ reactions 
 
On the other side of the emotional spectrum, one third of the subjects were disappointed 
from the result. It is important to notice that their dissatisfaction does not come entirely from 
the small payoff they received at the end – a situation they deemed “unfair”- but also because 
they wanted to perform better and to win the game. Even though some of them were given 5 
euros, the competitive attitude prevailed and made them leave the room dissatisfied. One might 
speculate that if the payoff were considerably higher, their mood would be different. Only two 
of the peers felt happy with the outcome, but still wanted to be the winner. However this does 
not change their overall satisfaction leaving them somewhere the two major groups. 
After the analysis of the participants’ own responses, one issue deserves additional 
attention. Some of the subjects in the “friendship” treatments noticed the presence of their 
friends in the other room and recognized it as an influential factor that contributed to their 
decision-making19. Yet none of them seemed to reflect on the positive emotional inducement. 
On the one hand, this is desirable because when framing is used, it is crucial for every study’s 
success that the subjects are completely unaware of any kind of manipulation. On the other 
hand, we cannot be sure that they noticed the “message” on the cards and that they connected 
this emotional stimulus with the second phase of the experiment – the Dictator game- when the 
                                                          
19 After the experiment finished, I was asked by some of the subjects about their friends’ presence and how this 
will distort my results. 
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altruism is measured. This problem will be thoroughly discussed in the next two parts of the 
discussion section. 
Theoretical explanations 
In order to provide a better grasp of what has been found in my study, it is worth 
investigating how some well-established theories and models present in the literature explain 
the results of my experiment and the personal motivations reported by the subjects.  
First let us discuss some theoretical concepts with respect to the justifications given by 
the participants regarding what is deemed just and fair. As we saw in the literature review, 
fairness is a key concept in public goods games, cooperation and altruistic behavior. I can 
identify two concepts that can clarify the rationale behind their decisions.  
Some of the subjects clearly expressed the opinion that it would make them feel bad to 
keep all the money, that they want to make the other player happy, that they want to be 
perceived as good persons, that they felt it right to give. The design of my experiment allows 
for this pure altruism to take place. This means that people do not gain any utility from giving, 
they just do it for the sake of the others. However, this might not be the case, as Andreoni (1990) 
pointed out. His concept of impure altruism, called “warm glow giving”, can serve as a possible 
explanation of the motives reported by some subjects. It were also their emotional stance and 
their conscience they considered when deciding the redistribution amount. This dual nature of 
altruism will be discussed later. 
As already noted, a considerable majority of the subjects used the words “fair” and “just” 
in their answers. Of course, this sounds very similar to the Rawlsian concept “Justice as 
Fairness” (1971). According to this paradigm, fairness is achieved through equality, and justice 
is a consequence of a fair agreement. Actually, the subjects in my experiment followed these 
principles when resolving the “redistribution dilemma”. Moreover, this particular behavioral 
pattern can be observed among the dictators from the “stranger” and among those from the 
“friendship” groups which reveals how the “veil of ignorance” works in practice. Fairness is a 
universal concept that does not distinguish based on previous or subsequent interactions, and it 
occurs in the anonymous treatments quite frequently.  
All this being said, it seems that it is not an easy task to completely negate the effect of 
the inherent sense of fairness human beings possess, even in the presence of competition. This 
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social mechanism, as Binmore (2009) argues, has evolved naturally and lies in the foundation 
of our evolution as a social species. He writes:  
“If I am right, this deep structure of fairness is written in our genes, and 
hence is universal in the human species.” 
Apart from the motives the subjects shared at the end of the experiment, I would like to 
change the course of this discussion by focusing on the results obtained from the data analysis. 
Let us begin with the statistically significant factor – friendship – and then move on to some 
plausible scenarios that could explain the lack of any impact of positive emotions on 
redistribution. 
Drawing on the findings from my study, it seems that the kind of social interaction can 
determine, if not the occurrence, at least the magnitude of prosocial behavior, i.e. people decide 
how much altruism to “invest” depending on the social context. Hence, it is reasonable to look 
for theoretical justifications among different social theories. There are three major theories I 
consider in that case: social exchange theory, social norms, and social evolution.  
The main assumptions of social exchange theory, as defined by Lawler and Thye (1999), 
embrace a more economic approach and, thus, resonate with rational choice theory. They 
postulate that individuals are self-interested and strive to maximize gain, whereas the 
relationships they engage in are interdependent. Homans (1974, cited by Cook and Rice 2001), 
who is one of the main developers of the theory, defined individual self-interested behavior as 
a unity of economic (external) and psychological (internal) needs. As for the essence of the 
relationships, they resemble market behavior in a sense that people assess costs and rewards 
from the interaction with the others, and also rank the alternatives (Homans, 1958).  
Furthermore, Homans (1958) points out that the more value a person expects to receive 
from a group or a single person, the more value he or she is willing to give to this particular 
group or person.  Put another way, how much the interaction with another human being is 
valuable to us impacts how much altruistic we want to be. Additionally, the net worth from the 
interaction is determined by its dependent nature, i.e. the approval of the others is needed. For 
their part, approval and trust are built over time, meaning that giving (cost) today actually 
creates an indirect benefit from a long-term relationship. Nye (1982, pp. 20-21, cited by Yaffe 
et al. 2006) suggests twelve propositions that facilitate the understanding of social exchange. 
For the purpose of my study, however, especially interesting appears to be Proposition 4 that 
states:  
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“Immediate outcomes being equal, they choose those alternatives that promise 
better long- term outcomes.” 
According to mathematics, five euros are more than four and three euros is more than 
only two. According to orthodox economics, more is always better than nothing. Nonetheless, 
what if the dictators reckoned all alternative payoffs from the game (immediate outcomes) 
being equal? This may happen when the cost of giving one additional euro to the other is 
considered negligible compared to the long-term benefits from friendship. That is why the 
subjects who played against their friends gave more on average. They value the higher gains 
from the relationship and are willing to provide more, as opposed to the case when they have 
to play against anonymous opponent. Since the dictator knows nothing about the peer, he or 
she is uncertain about the potential benefits in long-run, and therefore choose immediate 
outcomes that leads to less redistribution. Of course, some scholars disagree with the prevailing 
notion that altruism is a function of selfishness. Batson and Shaw (1991) proposed the empathy-
altruism hypothesis that empathetic feelings invoke a desire to help others, while personal 
benefits remain “unintended consequences” (p.114). One important condition for empathy to 
take place is the attachment to the other person. As the authors point out, “attachments based 
on cognitive generalization are usually weaker than those based on personal contact” (p.113). 
Furthermore, they claim that “intimate contact and dependency relation“(p.113) strengthen the 
attachment.  
All this being said, regardless of the essence of altruism (pure or based on self-interest), 
the conclusion that the existence of long-term relationship with another person can predict 
higher levels of pro-social behavior sounds quite convincing. 
The next theory looks at social norms as the driving force of pro-social behavior. Elster 
(2007) makes distinction among three kinds of norms – moral, social, and quasi-moral. The 
former is unconditional, but the other two are dependable upon the presence of other people.  
Quasi-moral norms which mechanism depends on the previous actions of the others- I 
claim- can be instrumental in inducing altruism in my experiment. I consider two particular 
norms of this kind – reciprocity and individual social responsibility. Gouldner (1960) defined 
two main propositions of reciprocity – people should help those who have helped them; people 
should not harm those who have helped them. He argues that: first, the norm of reciprocity is 
“a mechanism involved in the maintenance of any stable social system” and second, it provokes 
“motives for returning benefits even when power differences might invite exploitation” (p.174). 
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These two statements provide two logical explanations why friends were more generous. 
An interpersonal relationship reaches a stabilizing equilibrium that involves taking and giving 
as a long-term series of mutual benefits. My game is just a small link in this continuing 
interaction based on reciprocity. Additionally, the role of a dictator can be perceived as creating 
hierarchy between the players. In this case, the norm of reciprocity prevents the dictators from 
engaging in immediate exploitation because it postulates that one should return the favor 
regardless of power differences.  
In this regard, the second quasi-moral norm – social responsibility - can complement to 
this understanding. An intriguing definition of social responsibility norm (SRN)20 states that 
people occupying leadership positions are expected by society to be more responsible and to 
help others. Again, the dictatorship role may invoke the feeling that the dictator is responsible 
not only for his or her well-being, but also for the well-being of the peer, especially when this 
is a friend and empathy is then stronger, as Batson and Shaw (1991) claim. Of course, this is 
not the only possible mechanism how SRN operates. Benabou and Tirole (2010) outline three 
main drives if individual socially responsible behavior: pure altruism, material incentives, and 
reputational and self-esteem concerns. The authors point to the ambivalent nature of altruism. 
As with the social exchange theory, we could speculate what drives altruistic behavior – self-
interest or selfless concern about the other members of a group? Elster (2007) identifies two 
conditions that satisfy the emergence of pure altruism: the action benefiting others is proactive, 
not reactive; it is anonymous, in the sense that the identity of the benevolent actor is known 
neither to the beneﬁciary nor to third parties.” (p. 106). This implies that genuine altruism 
diminishes in the presence of other people, and more precisely, when the identity of the actor 
is well-known. In fact, this is the case with the friendship treatments where anonymity is not a 
factor anymore. However, I argue that we can observe pure altruism due to the feelings of 
closeness existing between two friends. 
I started my thesis with a few words regarding social evolution because it lies in the very 
basis of what constitutes social behavior in general. This branch of evolutionary theory 
considers the fitness of the others relative to the fitness of each individual. Of course, one of 
the pioneers of this theory is William D. Hamilton. In 1964, he published “The Genetical 
Evolution of Social Behavior, part I and II”, in which he defined four types of fitness 
maximizing behavior- mutual beneficial, selfish, altruistic, spiteful. Furthermore, he argued that 
                                                          
20 https://psychcentral.com/encyclopedia/social-responsibility-norm/ 
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for each person to act altruistically the ratio of benefits for the other to one unit of costs for the 
altruist (B/C) should be greater than 1/r, where r is the genetic relatedness between the two 
individuals. As Hamilton observed: “no one is prepared to sacrifice his life for any single person 
but that everyone will sacrifice it when he can thereby save more than two brothers, or four 
half-brothers, or eight first cousins…” (p. 16). Even though he argued that natural selection will 
always choose mutual beneficial and selfish behaviors, it is worth thinking of this evolutionary 
approach to altruism. Referring back to my experiment, we see that people who are relatively 
closer to the dictator enjoyed more generosity than those who are strangers. It is logical to 
expect that if one expands an individual’s social network starting from its very core (the nuclear 
family) and moving to its periphery and beyond, one will observe a diminishing effect of 
altruistic behavior and an increase of selfishness. We need to recall that all of the non-givers 
were in the “stranger” treatments. Of course, such dynamics have something to tell us. Hans 
Selye (1974, cited by Jackson, 2012) realized the evolutionary benefits of egoism and altruism 
and argued that their combination can facilitate peace and collaboration among the members of 
a particular society. His concept includes the awareness of the need for cooperation as a means 
to serve self-interest. Again, from the perspective of social evolution theory we discover the 
contradictory nature of altruism.  
This brief overview of three major theories that explain social behavior provided different 
scientific points of view why social networks matter when studying altruism or any kind of 
cooperative mechanism. However, one question remains unanswered: what type of altruism is 
present in my experiment? Table 6 summarizes the main statements of the three theories 
regarding this issue. 
Table 6: Theories of pro-social behavior 
 
 
It is a foregone conclusion that familiarity does induce more altruistic behavior that results 
in more redistribution. Thus, its quantitative contribution is undeniable. Yet we do not know 
much about its qualitative nature. Of course, the purpose of this study is not to answer this rather 
Theory Impure altruism Pure altruism
Social norms reciprocity norm social responsibility 
Social exchange economic needs psychological needs
Social evolution mutual benefit
conservation of 
related genes
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complex question by trying to unravel the “mystery” around impure and pure altruistic motives. 
How they operate when altering the kind of social interaction could be topic for a separate 
research. For now, we can suppose that both types of altruism are potentially present in my 
experiment. 
The other treatment in my design –positive emotions- revealed no statistically significant 
effect. However, the lack of any impact is also an intriguing finding. As it became clear from 
the literature review, most of the studies have considered negative emotions in their models and 
they seem to be more effective in manipulating subjects’ behavior. The reciprocation problem, 
mentioned by Stosny (2017), could be one possible reason.  
Another one could be that the subjects did not connect their actual mood with the 
emotional inducement (through the cards). To address this potential problem, we can refer to 
Schachter and Singer (1962) who provided additional insight on how emotions occur. They 
argued that this process is determined by two interrelated elements – physiological arousal and 
cognition. The authors made two important propositions. First, “given a state of physiological 
arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will “label” this state and 
describe his feeling in terms of the cognition available to him”(p. 381). Second, “given a state 
of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation….no 
evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the 
alternative cognitions available”(p.382). An interesting feature in this theory is the 
“misattribution of arousal” that can serve as an explanation why the emotional framing failed. 
A perfect example can be Dutton and Aron’s (1974) famous experiment with the suspension 
bridges. They found that the negative emotional state (sense of fear) surprisingly increased the 
subjects’ sexual attraction to the female interviewer because they attributed the physiological 
arousal to the presence of the young woman.  
A third possible explanation why positive emotions caused no effect on altruism is 
connected with the conditions that trigger empathy. FeldmanHall and Mobbs (2015) present a 
literature review on emotions and moral judgement, and conclude that more empathetic concern 
is provoked when the subjects are aware of the distress and pain of the others. Furthermore, 
FeldmanHall at al. (2015) demonstrate that empathetic concern is primarily driven by other-
directed emotions when somebody is in need, but their findings do not reject the role of altruistic 
behavior as an instrument to relief negative feelings. To sum up, people become more 
empathetic and altruistic when faced with somebody else’s pain, and due to the personal distress 
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they feel as a consequence of that. The absence of these two conditions could be a convincing 
reason for the null result in my study regarding positive emotions. 
Limitations and future research 
As with any research, my study has its limitations as well. Yet I do not only intend to 
discuss the shortcomings of my experimental design or sample size, but also to discuss some 
improvement and prospects for future work investigating the same topic. 
I can identify three major issues that demand more consideration. First and foremost, the 
results obtained from my study, although statistically significant are obtained from a very small 
sample. Recruiting enough students was not an easy task and budget and time constraints made 
this process even more challenging. Additionally, the design of my experiments required the 
recruitment of two persons for every single unit of observation. Admitting the small sample 
bias, however, does not prevent us from raising important questions and identifying intriguing 
effects worthy of studying. Therefore, one can look at my experiment as a pilot study, a first 
step to a series of experiments that can be the focus of a future research interest. A similar 
experiment can be conducted involving a lot more participants. A rule of thumb in the field of 
behavioral and experimental economics derived from the practice is that the minimum number 
of subjects per treatment group should be 3021. If I want to replicate my experiment this will 
mean 120 subjects at least.  
What is observed from my findings is that the emotions have a negative impact on 
altruism. Of course, this result is not statistically significant. However, this is an interesting 
hypothesis to test. Accordingly, I decided to run a statistical power test to compute an 
appropriate sample size and I used two different software tools that produced very similar 
results. When α= 0, 05 and power=0, 8, the observed mean difference between the two neutral 
and the two emotional treatments, if we combine them, would be significant, if there were 
approximately 250 subjects in the control and 250 in the treatment group. Of course, this 
number sounds quite ambitious, but one thing is for sure – a bigger sample with at least 30 
observations in each group can produce very interesting results. 
The second limitation is the kind of technique used to invoke emotions. Even though 
images are widely used in many neurological, behavioral and psychological studies, maybe the 
whole setting of the emotional inducement together the pictures used needs some 
                                                          
21 I want to thank Dean Mobbs at Caltech for making this suggestion. 
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improvements. Of course, one can try with different sorts of images, or by presenting them in 
another way to the subjects. However, I would also consider entirely different instrument. For 
example, Westermann et al. (1996) compared a variety of mood induction procedures and found 
that the presentation of motion picture or story proved itself to be highly effective in provoking 
both positive and negative mood states among the subjects. Of course, a more exhaustive review 
of the literature is needed to assess the qualities of these emotion inducing techniques. 
A third problem could be the amount of money earned at the end. As some of the 
participants discussed after one of the session, if the payoffs were substantially larger, they 
would have acted in the opposite manner. What I would do for a successive experiment, would 
be to increase the payoffs double (around 20 euros). Then an equal sharing should be evaluated 
differently by the dictators. 
Despite all limitations, this study raised some questions than can be addressed in the 
future. First of all, it will be interesting to compare the effect of positive emotions with negative 
ones. As it became clear so far, there is a considerable evidence in the literature that it is 
negative emotions that trigger cooperation and altruism. If this is the case, then does that mean 
that positive feelings do, in fact, decrease the desire to help others? One should bear in mind 
that this is the result from my experiment, but it was not statistically significant. A second 
experiment can attempt to put this hypothesis to the test. Of course, it may also confirm that 
positive emotions have no effect on altruism. Both outcomes could be important findings about 
human nature. This implies that the design needs to be altered – a control group with no 
emotions, positive emotions treatment, and negative emotions treatment.  
Another variation of the familiarity effect can also be implemented, even though the 
results are highly significant. Some might argue that the friendship connection between each 
pair of participants can be subject to any kind of noise. To resolve that, we can create a quasi-
long-term relationship between two strangers. For sure, this is not an identical situation, but it 
will tells whether it is the consequential interaction that matters22 or something else. The 
experimenter can design this type of effect by randomly pairing two strangers in the first phase 
of the experiment. Prior to the game, they are told that they have to come for the second phase 
next week23 and play against the same opponent whose identity will be revealed after the end 
of the first phase. This treatment will be compared to a control group that includes only one 
                                                          
22 In many repeated public games we observe a decline of individual contributions in the last round. 
23 To ensure that the subjects will come, the payoffs for the second part of the experiment can be raised 
dramatically. 
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phase. This design could eliminate all individual peculiarities that encompass a real-life 
relationship. 
An additional idea of a completely different experiment is to investigate what is the 
impact of competition. As I argued early, competition was used in my study as a tool to diminish 
the inherent sense of fairness people possess in general. In truth, some of the participants in the 
“stranger” treatments behaved more selfishly exactly because of the privilege effect caused 
winning and losing. Thus, a design involving competitive settings versus settings in which the 
subject do not compete can provide more insight into the role of competition when it comes to 
altruism. 
For any types of experimental designs that are centered on the same or a similar topic it 
is also possible to measure the intrinsic pro-social behavior of the subjects in advance. Since 
everyone has a unique sense of fairness or desire to help, this procedure would allow us to 
estimate the degree of effectiveness demonstrated by the variables of interest. This modification 
could be particularly useful when faced with a small sample size because all observations come 
from the same group of people (paired data) widely used in medical and psychological studies 
(Gosall and Singh, 2012). 
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Conclusions 
 
This research attempted to shed more light on the complex world of human emotions and 
relations. It compared the effect of emotional inducement placed in different social contexts 
(strangers versus friends) and provided further evidence about the role emotions play in pro-
social behavior. Additionally, my study highlighted the differences in altruistic responses when 
the kind of interpersonal interaction is taken into consideration. I argue that this type of research 
is important, because a better understanding of the interaction between rational and intuitive 
thinking, and the emotional bias in our personal or social life is crucial for the further evolution 
of social sciences. The rationality assumption cannot hold constantly in economic theories and 
therefore economists need to incorporate psychology, neuroscience and even evolutionary 
biology when developing economic models about consumers’ behavior, utility maximization 
or public choice. My research aimed to provide some answers in that direction.  
After exploring the relevant literature, I identified the following three research gaps: most 
of the experimental studies have focused on negative emotions, while positive emotions seem 
to be neglected; real social relationships should be introduced to the lab to isolate their effects 
and study them; our emotional reactions very often depend on the social context and the group 
or network an individual is part of, hence, one should look at them as a unity. To address this 
issues, I formulated my research questions and hypotheses and designed a laboratory 
experiment with four different treatments – a control group, a positive emotions group with 
strangers, an emotionally neutral group with friends, and a positive emotions group with friends. 
All subjects were matched in pairs and had to play the Dictator game.  
The statistical analysis of the data showed that each one of these treatments is not 
statistically significant because of the small number of observations in each group. However, 
when the “friendship” treatments are combined and compared to the “stranger” treatments, the 
result is highly significant, i.e. the dictators redistributed a lot more to their peer friends. As a 
main justification of their decisions they pointed out fairness and positive concern about the 
other’s well-being. I briefly presented three social theories that could explain the findings of 
my experiment. Each of them provides different motivations behind altruism. For social 
exchange theory it is the maximization of economic and psychological benefits; for the social 
norms theory it is the desire to act in accordance with the socially accepted forms of behavior; 
social evolution theory understands altruism as a strategy for survival and preservation of genes. 
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Whatever the rationale behind it, altruistic behavior possesses an ambivalent nature that 
manifests itself stronger within the social network of an individual.  
Positive emotions, on the other hand, appeared to be a weak predictor of altruism. 
Contrary to what was hypothesized, there is a negative effect which is not statistically 
significant though, but is anyway an interesting hypothesis to be tested in another experiment. 
I provided three possible explanations why positive feelings seem to be inappropriate for pro-
social behavior stimulation. First, it is harder to provoke positive reactions than negative ones. 
Second, misattribution of arousal is another possible explanation. Finally, connection between 
altruism and empathy suggests that in order to feel empathetic, an individual needs to be aware 
of the distress felt by the others which cause negative emotions instead. 
Even though I admit the limitations of my study, I argue that my experiment produced 
valid results and raised a few questions for further investigation and analysis. I can highlight 
two main conclusions based on my findings. First, by altering the social context or the social 
group, one could expect differences in the amount of altruism or the desire to help. Perhaps we 
should not only speak of the presence or absence of pro-social behavior, but also of the 
diminishing effects observed when moving away from the core of the social network. Second, 
altruistic behavior can be influenced by emotional stimuli, but only specific emotions can be 
effective that lie presumably in the negative spectrum. Of course, additional research and more 
experimental data are required to draw more precise conclusions. However, the contribution of 
the current work is that it set a direction for a series of new experiments that can shed more 
light on people’s altruistic behavior and the emotional responses associated with it when being 
part of different social relations. 
At the end, I would like to focus the reader’s attention on some implications of this type 
of studies and also the need of doing research on this topic in modern life. As we all know, 
long-lasting cooperation and mutual help lie in the foundation of every society’s success. As 
Ostrom (1990) demonstrates in her book, this mechanism is pretty stable and works almost 
perfectly in some small, compact communities. It is also a well-known fact that our species 
evolved by forming small kin-based groups. Maybe this is the natural way, or maybe this was 
natural back then. Anyway, today’s reality is very different from what seemed to be the case 
even one hundred years ago. We live in large metropolitans with several million inhabitants. 
Of course, it is impossible for each individual to form such a massive social network with such 
a high number of people.  
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In such a context, it is easier for phenomena like social alienation to take place. For many 
members of the society it creates feelings of powerlessness, meaningless, normlessness, 
isolation and self-estrangement (Lystad, 1972). Together with the possibility to remain 
anonymous in the crowd and free-ride or abstain from actively helping others, these feelings 
expectedly could have a negative impact on altruism and cooperation. Therefore, we need to 
face these issues and find solutions by studying pro-social behavior and what actually causes 
it. This knowledge can have some useful implementations in the case of collective action 
problems or when it comes to charity activities. For sure, the purpose of this thesis is not to give 
any policy recommendations, but rather to study a small part of the nature of altruistic behavior 
– a consequence of thousands of years of social and emotional evolution, connectedness, and 
interaction with other human beings. As one of the participants said after the experiment: “No 
one won, no one lost. Friendship won.” 
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Appendices 
A. Images used in the experiment 
Positive 
 
 
 
Neutral 
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B. Consent Form 
ID:……………… 
Consent Form 
Experiment Purpose & Procedure 
The purpose of this experiment is to test decision-making in social environment. 
The experiment consists of two parts, during which you will be first asked to solve a simple 
cognitive task (Memory game), and then play the Dictator game against another participant. 
After the experiment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire involving some 
demographics. At the end, you will be paid small monetary rewards. 
Please note that none of the tasks is a test of your personal intelligence or ability. The objective 
is to test the hypothesis of my study. 
Confidentiality 
The following data will be recorded: redistribution amounts, final payoffs, gender, field of 
studies, nationality, political views, socio-economic status.  
All data will be coded so that your anonymity will be protected in any research papers and 
presentations that result from this work. 
Finding out about result 
If interested, you can find out the result of the study by contacting the researcher Daniel 
Kalchev, or on 29.03 at the GSF Thesis Seminar. His e-mail address is: 
kalchev.daniel.x@student.uta.fi 
 
Record of Consent 
Your signature below indicates that you have understood the information about the current 
experiment and consent to your participation. The participation is voluntary and you may refuse 
to answer certain questions on the questionnaire and withdraw from the study at any time with 
no penalty. This does not waive your legal rights. If you have further questions related to this 
research, please contact the researcher. 
    
_________________ _________________ 
Participant Date 
_________________ _________________ 
Researcher Date 
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C. Rules of the experiment 
 
The rules of the experiment 
 
The experiment is divided into three major parts. First, each of the participants will be 
randomly matched with another participant in the other room. Then, the two players will 
have to play a simple cognitive game – Memory game- against each other. The memory game 
consists of 4 pairs that must be found. Each player will be given 8 cards laid face down.  You 
can turn over any two cards. If the two cards match, keep them. If they don't match, turn them 
back over. You need to remember the positions of each image in order to find the two identical 
images and match them in pairs. The player who manages to find and match all 4 pairs faster 
wins the Memory game. The experimenters will observe and announce the winners.  
The second part of the experiment is an economic game called “The Dictator Game”. The 
pairs from the first game remain the same, i.e. you play against the same person in the Dictator 
Game. Those of you who have won in the previous part will be assigned the role of a 
DICTATOR. The players who have lost in the Memory game will play as PEERS. The dictator 
receives 10 Euros by the experimenters, and has the right to keep them all and give nothing, or 
to redistribute a certain amount to the peer. Please note that you can round off the sum to either 
.00 or to 0.50! For example: 0.00; 0.50 cents; 1.00 euro; 1.50 euros; 2 euros; 2.50 euros; 3.00 
euros …, etc. Once the redistribution amounts are decided by the dictators, the experimenters 
will compute the payoffs from the game. The final monetary reward each participant will earn 
at the end is the sum of the show-up fee (5 euros) plus the outcome of the Dictator game, that 
is: 
 if you were a dictator: Final payoff= 5 + (10 – amount redistributed); 
 if you were a peer: Final payoff= 5 + amount redistributed. 
 
The last phase of the experiment is a short questionnaire each participant has to fill in. 
Then the final payoffs are paid and the experiment is over. 
Please note that talking and walking are not allowed during the experiment! The 
experimenters will announce when the entire procedure is over! If you have any questions, 
please contact the experimenters only! 
 
Thank you! 
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D. Game sheet 
ID:……...................... 
 
The Game 
 
 
You are playing against the same player from the first task! 
 
 
You are matched with Player ………… 
 
Your role is ……………………............ 
 
If you are a DICTATOR, please write down the amount you want to redistribute to the 
other player by choosing between 0 and 10 (reminder: you can round off the sum to either .00 
or 0.50; for example, 0.00; 0.50; 1.00; 1.50; 2; 2.50; 3.00, etc.) 
If you are a PEER, please, wait for the other player to make his or her decision. 
 
 
 
Amount redistributed: ……….……… 
 
 
 
 
Final payoff (computed by the experimenter): 
5€ show-up fee + ……….…… =………...……. 
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E. Questionnaire form 
ID:………………… 
Questionnaire 
 
1. Gender: please, choose one of the options below: 
□Female 
□ Male 
2. What is your field of studies (e.g. economics, business, computer science, healthcare, 
etc.)? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. Please, specify: in which income decile would you place yourself (or your family if 
you are not working), starting with 1 (the lowest income decile), up to 10 (the highest 
income decile)? Circle one of the options below: 
 
1. 2.      3.      4.      5.     6.      7.      8.      9.      10. 
 
4. What is your nationality? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. To what extend can you define yourself as a religious/spiritual person on a scale from 
1, being absolutely not religious, to 5, being extremely religious? Circle one of the 
options below: 
1. 2.      3.      4.      5. 
6. How would you position your political views on the left- wing/right- wing axis, if 1 is 
extreme left-wing, and 10 is extreme right-wing? Circle one of the options below: 
 
1.   2.      3.      4.      5.       6.       7.      8.      9.     10. 
 
7. Please, answer with 2-3 sentences, depending on your role in the game:  
If you were a DICTATOR: why did you make that decision? 
If you were a PEER: how do you feel about the outcome of the game? Are you 
satisfied with the result? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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